Housing, collateral constraints, and fiscal policy by Polattimur, Hamza
SFB 
823 
Housing, collateral 
constraints, and fiscal policy 
D
iscussion P
aper 
 
Hamza Polattimur 
 
 
 
Nr. 23/2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Housing, Collateral Constraints,
and Fiscal Policy
Hamza Polattimur
University of Dortmund
June 18, 2013
Abstract
This paper studies the preferential tax treatment of
housing that can be observed in many industrialized
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1 Introduction
Housing is subject to a preferential tax treatment in many industrialized countries.
In the US, total housing subsidies added up to 220 billion dollars in 2011, cor-
responding to 1.5% of GDP (US Budget, 2011). Also in European countries the
values of total housing subsidies in percent of GDP were in that range, e.g. 0.9% in
Germany, 1.1% in France and 1.4% in Spain in 2000 (ECB, 2003).
The two most important housing subsidies are the deductibility of mortgage
interest payments from income and the tax exemption of imputed rents on owner-
occupied housing. In the US, the former amounted to 105 billion dollars while the
latter added up to 38 billion dollars in 2011 (US Budget, 2011). These two subsidies
accounted for 65% of total housing subsidies.
However, the view of economists on this preferential tax treatment of housing is
controversial. On the one hand it is criticized by researchers like e.g. Poterba (1992)
and Gervais (2002) among others, who argue that this treatment leads to a welfare
loss since it distorts investment decisions of individuals towards housing. These
studies are in line with Rosen who writes in the Handbook of Public Economics
that paternalism and political considerations seem to be the sources of this policy
(1985, p. 380).
On the other hand there are proponents of this treatment who argue that home-
ownership is accompanied with externalities which are internalized through these
subsidies. For instance, Green and White (1997) stress the positive impact of home-
ownership on education of children and DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) state that
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homeowners are better citizensin the sense that they are more involved in local
organizations.
In contrast to these papers, this work gives a rationale for housing subsidies
based on market imperfections. We assume that private loans are not enforceable
and therefore have to be collateralized by housing. Looking at the data makes the
importance of housing as a component of wealth and the relevance of its usage as
collateral clear. First, housing makes up a large part of total household wealth
as well as total national wealth. In the US, housing wealth accounts for half of
total household wealth and is larger than annual GDP with an average ratio of
housing wealth to GDP of about 1.5 from 1952-2008 (Iacoviello, 2009). Secondly, in
2010 residential mortgage debt amounted to 77% of GDP in the US and to 47% in
Germany, to 41% in France and to 64% in Spain (Hypostat, 2010). To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the rst one that studies optimal taxation of housing
in the presence of collateral constraints.
The structure of the model is as follows. We consider a household sector that
relates to Kiyotaki and Moores (1997) model with two types of agents who di¤er in
their discount factors, patient and impatient ones. Due to this di¤erence in patience
we get lenders, the patient agents, and borrowers, the impatient ones, in equilib-
rium. While for the former the collateral constraint is irrelevant in equilibrium, it
is of importance for the latter. As in Iacoviello (2005) housing plays a dual role
for households. First, it delivers utility to the agents together with consumption
and leisure and secondly, private loans are collateralized by housing. The govern-
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ment, that is assumed to have access to a commitment technology, has exogenous
expenditures that have to be nanced by two taxes, a housing property tax that can
di¤er for the two types of agents and a labor income tax. The di¤erent housing tax
rates for the two types can be understood as follows. The patient households for
whom the collateral constraint is irrelevant will always own a larger house than the
impatient ones and therefore are taxed at another, a higher, rate than the impatient
and hence wealth-poor agents.
The main result of this paper is that it provides a rationale for housing subsidies.
In the presence of collateral constraints, optimal scal policy should subsidize hous-
ing of the impatient households, for whom the collateral constraint is relevant, to
disburden them. This subsidy has to be nanced to the largest extent by a housing
tax on the patient households and to a smaller part by a labor income tax. Hence,
this can be interpreted as redistribution from wealth-rich patient households with
a higher housing stock to wealth-poor impatient households with a lower housing
stock.
The main result of housing subsidies for impatient households is robust to sev-
eral parameter variations and can be attributed for the most part to the collateral
constraint. To illustrate this point, we analyze the e¤ects of the discount rate dif-
ference of the types of agents on housing subsidies in comparison to the e¤ects of
the collateral constraint, with the result that the former plays a minor role.
We also consider a representative agent version of the model as reference case.
Thereby we can understand how the inclusion of a durable good, housing, per se
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a¤ects optimal scal policy compared to standard models. Furthermore, this allows
us to compare the results of the representative agent version to existing literature.
These results are in fact quite intuitive and in line with the principle of optimal
taxation that goods with lower elasticities should be taxed at a higher rate. For the
benchmark calibration, the housing tax rate is positive in the representative agent
version as it is for patient households in the model with two types of agents.
The paper further relates to the work of Eerola and Määttänen (2009) that
considers optimal taxation of housing in a dynamic representative agent model with
fairly general preferences and an extended tax system compared to the model of
this paper. However, the results of the representative agent version of our model
are compatible with their results. Another closely related paper is Monacelli (2008)
that considers a model with two types of agents with di¤erent patience rates and
collateral constraints similar to the one of this paper. While Monacelli analyses
optimal monetary policy in that framework, he points out that also the analysis
of optimal scal policy in such a model would be of interest, which is done in this
paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model with two
types of agents, rms and the government is described, the Ramsey problem is set
up and the equilibrium conditions for the steady state are derived. In section 3, the
results for the full as well as the representative agent version are presented and a
sensitivity analysis is given. The fourth and last section concludes.
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2 The Model
In this section, we present the model with a household sector consisting of two types
of agents, a production sector consisting of two types of rms and the government.
Concerning the household sector, we follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), who pio-
neered the models with two types of agents, patient and impatient ones, resulting in
an equilibrium with lenders and borrowers. We assume that private debt contracts
are not enforceable and have to be collateralized by housing as in Iacoviello (2005).
Therefore, a household can only borrow up to a fraction m of his expected end
of period housing wealth. Additionally to its usage as collateral, housing delivers
utility together with consumption and leisure.
Like in Favilukis et al. (2012), we consider a two-sector production side, such
that both housing demand and supply are modeled explicitly. There are two types of
rms, one of which produces non-durable consumption goods and the other durable
housing.
The government levies a at-rate tax on labor income and a housing property tax
that can di¤er for the two types of agents and issues one-period bonds to nance
an exogenous stream of government expenditures. It has no access to lump-sum
taxes. The reason why housing tax rates can di¤er is that a patient household will
own a larger house than an impatient one. Hence, rather than taxing degrees of
patience di¤erently, we can understand this as taxing the ones with a larger house
at a higher rate than the ones with a smaller house. Due to the usage of housing as
collateral that is only relevant for the borrowers, who will be the impatient agents
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in equilibrium, we will see that the housing tax rates will di¤er markedly.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households consisting of two types, patient and impatient
ones. They di¤er in their discount factors 1 >  > 0 > 0 with  being the
discount factor of patient and 0 of impatient households. Henceforth, variables of
patient (impatient) households are denoted without (with) a prime, while aggregate
variables are denoted with a superscript T (e.g. cTt , for total consumption). The
population share of patient households is s. Borrowing between the two types of
households is modeled as follows. A household can borrow an amount   bt
1+rt 1
in
period t  1 and has to pay back  bt in period t, where rt 1 is the real interest rate
on loans between t  1 and t. Since we assume that private debt contracts are not
enforceable, there is a limit on private debt given by a fraction m of the expected
end of period housing wealth
b
(0)
t+1   mph;t+1h(0)t , (1)
where m denotes the exogenous pledgeable fraction of housing. As we will see
below, this constraint will become relevant for impatient households, while it will
be irrelevant for patient ones.
Both types of households derive utility from consumption c(0)t and housing h
(0)
t
and disutility from labor n(0)t and maximize the innite sum of expected utility. Their
objective is given by
1X
t=0
(0)tu(c(0)t ; h
(0)
t ; n
(0)
t ). (2)
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We consider the following CRRA-specication of the utility function
u(ct; ht; nt) =
c1 
c
t
1  c +
h1 
h
t
1  h  
n1+
n
t
1 + n
; (3)
where c(h) denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption (housing) and n the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
2.1.1 Patient Households
The representative patient household generates income from working wtnt, with wt
being the real wage rate and the return of bond holdings bgt . Labor income is taxed
at the rate nt . Every period the household can adjust its stock of housing according
to ht   (1  h)ht 1 at the price of housing ph;t, with h being the depreciation rate
of housing. The value of the housing stock owned by the household is taxed at the
rate ht . Thus we consider a housing property tax, that is proportional to the value
of the current housing stock and is paid every period. The budget constraint of the
patient households is given by
ct + ph;t
 
1 + ht

ht   (1  h)ht 1

+
bgt+1
Rgt
+
bt+1
Rt
(4)
=(1  nt )wtnt + bgt + bt;
where ct denotes consumption spending,
bgt+1
Rgt
investment in new government bonds
with the relating gross interest rate Rgt = 1 + r
g
t and bt privately issued debt with
the gross interest rate Rt = 1+rt. The patient household will hold positive amounts
of bgt > 0 and bt > 0 and hence be lender in equilibrium. Thats why the collateral
constraint (1) will be irrelevant for patient households: bt+1 > 0 >  mph;t+1ht.
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2.1.2 Impatient Households
The budget constraint of the representative impatient household analogously reads
c0t + ph;t
 
1 +  0ht

h0t   (1  h)h0t 1

+
b0gt+1
Rgt
+
b0t+1
Rt
(5)
=(1  nt )wtn0t + b0gt + b0t.
Since we rule out short sales in government bonds, the impatient households will set
b0gt+1 = b
0g
t = 0. Furthermore, this type will be the private borrower in equilibirium,
i.e. b0t+1 =   s1 sbt+1 < 0, following from the market clearing condition for private
debt (1  s) b0t+1+sbt+1 = 0. Hence, the collateral constraint (1) will become relevant
here. Therefore, there is a a limit on the obligations of impatient households which
is given by b0t+1   mph;t+1h0t.
2.2 Government
The government levies a at-rate tax on labor income nt and a housing property tax

(0)h
t and issues one-period bonds (b
(0)g
t  0 8t  0) to nance an exogenous stream
of government expenditures (gt):
gt   b
g
t+1
Rgt
+ bgt = s
h
t ph;tht + (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t + nt wtnTt ; (6)
where nTt = snt + (1  s)n0t denotes total labor supply. As mentioned before, the
di¤erent housing tax rates ht and 
0h
t can be understood as taxing the wealthier
agents which will be the patient households in equilibrium at a rate that di¤ers
from (and will be higher than) the one for the wealth-poor impatient households
which will own smaller houses in equilibrium.
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2.3 Firms
The production side of the economy is characterized by two sectors, one of which
produces consumption goods yc and the other housing yh. In both sectors there is
a continuum of rms, which are assumed to produce with the same technology for
simplicity. The representative rm of each sector produces its output with labor
according to
yc;t=n
T
c;t
yh;t=n
T
h;t;
where total labor input in each sector is given by the weighted sum of labor input
of the patient and impatient household in this sector nTc;t = snc;t + (1  s)n0c;t and
nTh;t = snh;t + (1  s)n0h;t. On the other hand, total labor supply nTt = snt +
(1  s)n0t = nTc;t + nTh;t is splitted between the two types of rms. Labor is assumed
to be totally mobile between the two sectors leading to a wage rate that is the same
for both sectors.
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
We now describe the competitive equilibrium of the private sector and then set up
the Ramsey problem.
Patient Households
A patient household chooses the values of ct, ht, nt, b
g
t+1 and bt+1 to maximize
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(2) subject to the budget constraint (4) leading to the rst order conditions
h 
h
t =
 
1 + ht

ph;tc
 c
t   c 
c
t+1 (1  h) ph;t+1 (7)
n
n
t =(1  nt )wtc 
c
t (8)
c 
c
t = R
g
t c
 c
t+1 (9)
c 
c
t = Rtc
 c
t+1 : (10)
Equation (7) describes housing demand. In the optimum, the marginal utility of
current housing h 
h
t equals the marginal utility of foregone consumption c
 c
t at the
gross price of housing
 
1 + ht

ph;t less the discounted marginal utility of next pe-
riods consumption c 
c
t+1 achieved from selling the house after depreciation (1  h)
at the price ph;t+1. Equation (8), that is fairly standard, describes labor supply of a
patient household and equates the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and leisure n
n
t
c 
c
t
to the net real wage rate (1  nt )wt. Equations (9) and (10)
are Euler equations with respect to public and private lending.
Impatient Households
An impatient household chooses the values of c0t, h
0
t, n
0
t and b
0
t+1 to maximize (2)
subject to the budget constraint (5) and the collateral constraint (1) leading to the
rst order conditions
h0 
h
t =
 
1 + ht

ph;tc
0 c
t   0c0 
c
t+1 (1  h) ph;t+1 + !tmph;t+1 (11)
n0
n
t =(1  nt )wtc0 
c
t (12)
!t=
c0 
c
t   0c0 
c
t+1 Rt
Rt
(13)
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and the complementary slackness conditions
!t
 
b0t+1 +mph;t+1h
0
t

= 0; b0t+1 +mph;t+1h
0
t  0; !t  0:
Equation (11) decribes housing demand of an impatient household. The term
!tmph;t+1 stems from the collateral constraint, with !t being the multiplier on this
constraint. Equation (12) is the labor supply function of an impatient household.
Equation (13) is the modied Euler equation resulting from the fact that the im-
patient household is borrowing constrained. In the steady state, the collateral con-
straint will be binding as we can see from (10) which becomes 1
R
=  and (13)
leading to ! = c0 
c
(1=R  0) = c0 c (   0) > 0. Finally, from the complemen-
tary slackness conditions we get b0 +mphh0 = 0, b0 =  mphh0.
Furthermore, the transversality conditions limt!1 
tuct
 bgt+1
Rgt
= 0 and
limt!1 
tuct
b0t+1
Rt
= 0 must hold, of which the latter is redundant due to the collateral
constraint that is more restrictive.
Firms
In both sectors the representative rm maximizes prots according to
max
nTc;t
c;t = max
nTc;t
 
nTc;t   wtnTc;t

in the nal consumption goods sector and
max
nTh;t
h;t = max
nTh;t
 
ph;tn
T
h;t   wtnTh;t

11
in the housing sector leading to the rst order conditions
wt = 1 and ph;t = 1.
Aggregate Ressource Constraint
Finally, due to identical production thechnologies and perfect mobility of labor
between the two sectors, the aggregate ressource constraint is given by (see Appendix
5.1)
cTt + gt + ph;th
T
t = yc;t + ph;tyh;t + (1  h)ph;thTt 1: (14)
2.5 The Ramsey Problem
We assume that the government has access to a commitment technology and is able
bind itself to its policy. The government chooses the values of ht, ct, nt, h0t, c
0
t,
n0t and the tax rates 
h
t ; 
0h
t and 
n
t in order to maximize social welfare subject to
the private sector equilibrium conditions, the ressource and the implementability
constraint summarized in Appendix 5.2.1, while nancing an exogenous stream of
government expenditures fgtg1t=0. Following Monacelli (2008), in this economy with
two types of agents, social welfare is measured by the weighted sum of utility of the
two types
1X
t=0
tsu(ct; ht; nt) + 
0t (1  s)u(c0t; h0t; n0t)
and the aggregate discount rate is dened as e = s0(1 s) to be used as discount
rate for the constraints. For the mathematical formulation of the Ramsey problem
see Appendix 5.2.2. The rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem and the steady
state are derived in Appendix 5.2.4.
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3 Results
This section presents and discusses optimal taxation results of the model. First, as
a natural starting point of the analysis, results for the representative agent version,
which can be derived analytically, will be given. The relation of these results to
existing literature on optimal taxation will be discussed. Lateron, numerical results
for the full version of the model will be given and compared with the results of the
representative agent version in order to point out the role of the collateral constraint.
Finally, we will compare the role of the di¤erence in discount rates against the role
of the collateral constraint and present sensitivity analyses.
3.1 Representative Agent Version
By setting the discount rate of the impatient agents equal to the one of the patient
agents, 0 = , the model collapses to a representative agent version. For this
version, we can derive analytical solutions for the steady state tax rates which are
the labor income tax n and the housing property tax h.
The optimal steady state tax rate on labor income is given by (see Appendix
5.3.1)
n =
 (n + c)
1 +  (1 + n)
> 0 for  > 0;
and is positive for  > 0. It only depends on the multiplier on the implementability
constraint   0 and the parameters c and h.
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The optimal steady state tax rate on housing is given by (see Appendix 5.3.1)
h =

1  
h   c
h   1| {z }
(i)
(1   (1  h))| {z }
(ii)
: (15)
This equation reects two features of housing: (i) can be attributed to the fact
that housing delivers utility like consumption and (ii) to the durability of housing.
For  > 0, the sign of the tax rate, thus the question whether housing should be
taxed or subsidized, depends on the parameters h and c. For the sign of h, the
term (ii) in (15) can be neglected since 1   (1  h)| {z }
2(0;1)
is positive. Here, the analysis
has to be restricted to values of  <  = 1
h 1 , since for larger values the second
derivatives become positive resulting in minima (see Appendix 5.3.2).
As mentioned before, the sign of h only depends on the term (i) in (15). From
principles of optimal taxation we know that goods with lower elasticities should
be taxed at a higher rate. Since we do not consider a consumption tax at all,
whether housing should be taxed or subsidized depends on whether its intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is lower or higher than the one of consumption. There are
three cases:
1. For c = h housing and consumption should be treated identically due to
indentical intertemporal elasticities of substitution, leading to an optimal tax
rate on housing of zero.
2. If the elasticity of housing is smaller than the one of consumption, i.e. 1
c
>
1
h
, c < h, the optimal housing tax rate is positive.
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3. For c > h the optimal housing tax rate is negative since the elasticity of
consumption is smaller than the one of housing.
These results are compatible with the ones of Eerola and Määttänen (2009) who
consider a more general representative agent framework with capital and optimal
taxation of capital in addition to housing.
While the term (ii) in (15) is irrelevant for the sign of h, it has a large e¤ect
on the size of it. For the baseline calibration (see Table 1) for instance, it reduces
the housing tax by more than 97%. However, the higher h is, i.e. the lower the
durability of housing is, the smaller is the impact of (ii) on the size of h. Notice,
that (ii) disappears for the case h = 1, where durability of housing is assumed away
and housing fully depreciates within one period.
3.2 Results of the Full Version
Since analytical results are not available for the full version, we consider numerical
results for the steady state, where the collateral constraint is binding, as we have
seen before in section 2.4. For comparison, we also give numerical results for the
representative agent version and the baseline calibration.
3.2.1 Calibration
In this section, the baseline calibration of the model is described. Following Iacoviello
(2005), one time period is set to one quarter and the discount factor of patient
households to  = 0:99 leading to a steady state gross real interest rate of R = 1:01,
which is equivalent to an annual real interest rate of 4%. The discount factor of
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impatient households is set to 0 = 0:95 by Iacoviello (2005) as a compromise of the
estimates given in the literature, which is adopted here. However, in section 3.3, we
will consider a variation in 0 between 0:95 and 0:97 to see how this a¤ects the result.
In order to get a wage share of patient households equal to swn
swn+(1 s)wn0 = 0:64 as in
Iacoviello (2005), we set s = 0:62, while we will also show in the sensitivity analyses
3.4 how a variation in population shares alters the results. Furthermore, we set the
pledgeable fraction of housing to m = 0:55 resulting from an estimation of Iacoviello
(2005). Hence, an impatient agent can only borrow to 55% of the value of his house.
We will also consider in section 3.3, how a variation in m between 0 and 1, which
covers all relevant values for m, a¤ects the results. The depreciation rate of housing
is set following Davis and Heathcote (2005), who estimate an annual rate of 1:41%.
According to this we set h = 0:0035 for a quarter.
In the calibration of the utility parameters c and n we follow King and Rebelo
(1999), who say that the basic RBC model with log utility in consumption implies
a labor supply elasticity of 4. Hence, we set c = 1 and n = 1=4, while we will also
conduct robustness checks for both of these parameters in section 3.4.
Since the aim of the paper is to evaluate optimal taxation of housing, the utility
parameter of housing h is calibrated in order to match an empirical fact on housing.
According to Iacoviello (2009), where some stylized facts about housing, that sould
be matched when calibrating models of housing, are listed, total housing stock is
on average 1:5 times as large as annual GDP in the US between 1952 and 2008.
Therefore, we set the parameter h in order to match this value. Since in the model
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Table 1: Baseline Parameter Calibration.
Description Source/Target Parameter Value
Discount factor patient households Iaco. 2005  0:99
Discount factor impatient households Iaco. 2005 0 0:95
Pledgable fraction of housing Iaco. 2005 m 0:55
Depreciation rate of housing D&H 2005 h 0:0035
Share of the patient households wage share = 0:64 s 0:62
Inverse of Frisch elasticity K&R 1999 n 1=4
Inverse of IES in consumption K&R 1999 c 1
Inverse of IES in housing hT =y = 6 h 1:75
Government expenditures g=y = 0:17 g 0:172
Government debt bg=y = 3 bg 3:1
one time period is one quarter and hence y in the notation of the model denotes
quarterly GDP, we have to multiply this value by four and to match the ratio of total
housing stock to quarterly GDP of h
T
y
= 6. This is achieved by setting h = 1:75
leading to an elasticitiy of 1
h
= 4=7. Nevertheless, we will also give sensitivity
results concerning the parameter h in section 3.4.
For the calibration of governmental variables g and bg we use data from the
Worldbank (2012). In 2010, US general government nal consumption expenditures
amounted to 17% of annual GDP. Since both, government expenditures and GDP
are ow variables, the ratio is the same for a time period of one quarter, g
y
= 0:17.
Moreover, US total central government debt made up 76:8% of annual GDP in 2010.
Since government debt is a stock variable, this value again has to be multiplied by
four. Hence the ratio we have to match in terms of quarterly GDP is given by b
g
y
= 3.
These values of the governmental variables are achieved by setting g = 0:172 and
bg = 3:1. The baseline parameter calibration is summarized in Table 1.
Given this parameter calibration we compute the steady state numerically, which
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delivers the optimal values of consumption, housing and labor for both types of
agents as well as the optimal tax rates h,  0h and n.
3.2.2 Numerical Results
The results of the full and the representative agent version for the baseline calibration
are summarized in Table 2. Notice, that the optimal tax rate on housing in the
representative agent version is close to zero but still positive (h = 0:2%), while
for the full model we get two housing tax rates that di¤er both markedly from
zero. The optimal housing tax rate for patient households is h = 1:65% and the
one for impatient households  0h =  2:72%. Thus for the baseline calibration, it
is optimal to subsidize housing of impatient and hence constrained households and
to tax patient ones in the full version, while in the representative agent version
housing is taxed at a rate close to zero. Hence the subsidy for impatient households
results from the heterogeneity in patience rates and the collateral constraint, that
are absent in the representative agent version.
To see how this subsidy optimally is nanced, we consider the government budget
(6) in the steady state
g + (1  ) bg = nnT + shh+ (1  s)  0hh0: (16)
Expenditures are given by g + (1  ) bg = 0:203 and revenues by nnT + shh +
(1  s)  0hh0 = 0:1887+ 0:0668  0:0526 = 0:203. We see, that the labor income tax
nances government expenditures, while the housing subsidy for impatient house-
holds is nanced for the most part by a housing tax on the patient households.
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Therefore, the housing tax rate on the patient households is much larger than the
tax rate on housing in the representative agent version. This point becomes clearer,
when we consider the case g = bg = 0 (last column of Table 2). For this case
the left hand side of the government budget (16) is zero, g + (1  ) bg = 0 and
a large decline in the labor income tax rate. On the right hand of (16) we have
revenues from taxing labor income equal to nnT = 0:029, revenues from taxing
housing of patient households given by shh = 0:069 and housing subsidies for im-
patient households equal (1  s)  0hh0 =  0:098. Once again we see that the largest
part, more than 70%, of housing subsidies are nanced by taxing housing of patient
households. Hence, this can be interpreted as a redistribution from wealth-rich, i.e.
patient households with a higher housing stock (h = 6:5) to wealth-poor households
with a lower housing stock (h0 = 5:1).
To link these results to the empirical ndings described in the introduction, we
compute the ratio of total housing subsidies to GDP given by  (1 s)
0hh0
swn+(1 s)wn0 . For the
baseline calibration we get a ratio of 5:24%. Hence, according to the model the
granted subsidies in the US that added up to 1:5% of GDP in 2011 seem to be lower
than what would be optimal. On the other hand, the model is likely to overestimate
housing subsidies since it does not incorporate physical capital. Housing is the only
component of wealth in the model, while in the US it accounts for half of total
household wealth (see e.g. Iacoviello (2009)).
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Table 2: Numerical Results - Comparison.
Version Repr. Agent Full Version
Calibration Baseline Baseline g = bg = 0
c 0:8161 0:7999 0:9485
h 9:6310 6:5323 7:4249
n 1:0218 1:0630 1:0954
c0   0:8316 1:0136
h0   5:0929 6:6759
n0   0:9100 0:8398
n 0:1795 0:1878 0:0296
h 0:0020 0:0165 0:0149
 0h    0:0272  0:0388
3.3 Discounting vs. Collateral Constraint
The result of subsidizing impatient agentshousing is due to two features of the
model, as we have seen in the previous section, the di¤erent discount rates of the
two types and the collateral constraint, while the former is necessary for the latter.
Without di¤erent discount rates the model collapses to the representative agent
version where private borrowing and hence the collateral constraint are irrelevant.
The aim of this section is to analyze how these two features a¤ect housing subsi-
dies. Therefore we rst dene the two e¤ects related to these two features. Housing
subsidies stemming from the collateral constraint that are granted by the Ramsey
planer in order to soften the constraint and hence originate from the market friction
are attributed to the collateral e¤ect, whereas housing subsidies that purely stem
from the di¤erence in discounting and hence are based on preferences are attibuted
to the discount rate e¤ect. To identify how housing subsidies are a¤ected by these
two e¤ects, we conduct the following experiment. First, we consider a variation in
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Figure 1: E¤ects of varying the pledgeable fraction of housing m for the baseline
calibration with s = 0:5.
the pledgeable fraction of housing, m, reaching from 0 to 1 and illustrate in Figure 1
how this a¤ects the housing tax rates h and  0h, private debt given by (1  s)mh0,
the di¤erence in housing stocks of the two agents, h   h0 , the tightness of the
collateral constraint measured by ! = c0 
c
(   0) (see (13)) and redistribution
measured by the ratio of revenues from taxing housing of the patient agents to the
subsidies that impatient agents receive: Red =   shh
(1 s)h0 0h . The plots are given for
the benchmark calibration with equal shares, s = 0:5, for convenience in aggrega-
tion. Then we do the same for a variation in the borrowersdiscount rate between
0 = 0:95 and 00:97.
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First, consider the lower limit m = 0, where private borrowing and hence the
collateral e¤ect is shut down (see Iacoviello (2005) for a similar experiment). Since
the link between borrowing and housing of the impatient household is cut o¤, in
this case the resulting level of subsidies is only due the discount rate e¤ect. Then
the variation in m between the lower and upper limit m = 1, where housing is fully
pledgeable, illustrates the role of the collateral e¤ect compared to the discount rate
e¤ect for a given 0 = 0:95. Figure 1 shows that a higher pledgeable fraction of
housing leads to a larger amount of private debt (panel 2) and hence to a tighter
collateral constraint (panel 3) resulting in a higher level of housing subsidies for the
constrained households (panel 1, dashed line), whereas the tax rate on the patient
agents does not change much (panel 1, solid line). This is due to the fact that
the collateral constraint and hence the parameter m is not directly relevant for the
patient agents. Thus, the level of redistribution (panel 4), as it is measured here,
decreases in m since housing subsidies to impatient agents rise faster than housing
tax revenues from patient ones do.
For m = 0, where the collateral channel is shut down, the resulting subsidy is
 0h =  1:04%, whereas for the baseline case of m = 0:55 it more than doubles
to  0h =  2:24%. This makes clear that housing subsidies not only result from
a di¤erence in preference parameters but are also due to the market friction, the
collateral constraint. Regarding the rates just mentioned and taking into account
that the discount rate channel dampens the e¤ect of the collateral channel, which is
discussed below, more than half of the resulting subsidies can be attributed to the
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Figure 2: E¤ects of varying the impatient agentsdiscount rate 0 for the baseline
calibration with s = 0:5.
collateral constraint in the baseline calibration.
Figure 2 plots the results for a variation in 0. Notice that 0 decreases, i.e.
the di¤erence in discount rates increases from left to right on the abscissa. The
higher this di¤erence is, the larger is the housing subsidy for impatient agents  0h
(panel 1, dashed line) and the housing tax for patient agents h (panel 1, solid
line). In contrast to the variation in m the variation in 0 a¤ects both rates equally.
As for a higher m the level of redistribution (panel 4) decreases in the di¤erence
in discount rates for the same reason. In contrast, unlike a higher m leading to
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Table 3: Numerical Results - Robustness.
Baseline Calibration, except
  h = 1:5 c = 2 s = 0:5
c 0:7999 0:7933 0:8713 0:7950
h 6:5323 9:2023 6:8915 5:9908
n 1:0630 1:0965 1:1581 1:0595
c0 0:8316 0:8396 0:8945 0:8198
h0 5:0929 6:8126 5:6412 4:7861
n0 0:9100 0:8739 0:9383 0:9370
n 0:1878 0:1882 0:2124 0:1935
h 0:0165 0:0150 0:0124 0:0212
 0h  0:0272  0:0281  0:0366  0:0224
higher borrowing, a larger discount rate di¤erence lowers borrowing since it reduces
housing of the impatient agents. Hence, we can conclude that the discount rate
e¤ect dampens the collateral e¤ect in reducing private borrowing.
3.4 Sensitivity Analyses
In the previous section, we have seen that the main result of optimality of housing
subsidies to impatient agents is robust to variations in the parameters m and 0.
In this section, we will check whether it is also robust to changes in the parameters
c, h and s. Two interesting questions come here in mind. The rst question is,
what happens if the intertemporal elasticities are changed, i.e. if h < c. Since we
have seen that this changed the sign of the housing tax in the representative agent
version, it is interesting to see how this change in the parameters will a¤ect optimal
taxation in the full version. Another question we will explore is what happens, if
the share of lenders s is changed. We will consider the case where both types have
equal shares s = 0:5. Table 3 summarizes the results.
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First of all, we can conclude from Table 3, that for every parameter variation
we consider, it remains optimal to subzidize housing of impatient households and to
tax housing of patient ones.
In the third column where we lower h, housing demand rises and both types have
higher housing stocks (h
T
y
 8:2) compared to the baseline calibration in column 2 of
Table 3. Athough h is lower, tax revenues from taxing housing of patient agents are
higher due to their higher housing stock h = 9:2. Therefore, subsidies for impatient
households can increase slightly.
In column 4, we set c = 2 > h = 1:75 and we see that, in contrast to the
respresentative agent version, there is no important change in the tax rates. More-
over,  0h becomes larger while h decreases, since households attach a higher value
to housing compared to consumption. As a result, both types work more to own a
larger house, while the labor income tax increases to nance the subsidies.
In column 5 the share of lenders in the economy is lower than in the baseline
calibration. This means that there are less wealth-rich households in the economy
who bear the tax burden. Therefore, the tax rates n and h are higher while the
subsidy  0h is lower. As a result both types of households have lower consumption
and housing levels.
Summing up, in every variation we considered, m, 0, h and s, the main result
of the paper holds: it is optimal to disburden the impatient and hence constrained
households by subsidizing their housing.
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4 Conclusion
Housing subsidies that can be observed in many industrialized countries have been
subject to macroeconomic research since many years. Nevertheless, there is no
denite conclusion one can draw from this research. While the opponents point
at ine¢ ciencies resulting from housing subsidies due to distortions in investment
decisions of agents, the proponents argue that subsidies internalize externalities
accompanied with homeownership.
This paper, where we have studied optimal taxation of housing in a borrower-
lender framework resulting from di¤erent discount rates with housing being used
as collateral for private loans, provides results in favor of housing subsidies. The
main result of this paper is that in such an economy, optimal scal policy should
disburden impatient borrowers by subsidizing their housing in the presence of collat-
eral constraints. This subsidy has to be nanced to the largest extent by a housing
tax on the patient and unconstrained households and to a smaller part by a la-
bor income tax. Hence, redistribution from patient/unconstrained households to
impatient/constrained ones takes place.
In this framework housing subsidies result from two features of the model, the
di¤erent discount rates of the two types of agents and the collateral constraint.
We have seen that for the baseline calibration more than half of the subsidy can be
attributed to the collateral constraint. Hence, housing subsidies not only result from
the di¤erence in preference parameters but are also due to the market friction in our
model. Moreover, the sensitivity analyses showed that the main result of housing
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subsidies for constrained households is robust to several parameter variations.
Furthermore, we considered a representative agent version of the model the re-
sults of which are quite intuitive and in line with the principles of optimal taxation.
For the baseline calibration however, it was not optimal to subsidize housing in this
environment unlike for the model with two types and collateral constraints.
This paper gives a rationale for housing subsidies other than externalities that
have been focused on in previous literature and indicates a new path for further
research. An extension of the model could be the addition of inter-generational
heterogeneity in an overlapping generations model as in Gervais (2002). The life
cycle behavior of agents could also have substantial implications and should also
be accounted for when trying to measure the e¤ects of housing subsidies on social
welfare. This is left for future research.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Aggregate Ressource Constraint
Consolidation of the budget constraints (4), (5) and (6) delivers
sct + (1  s) c0t + sph;t
 
1 + ht

ht   (1  h)ht 1

+(1  s) ph;t
 
1 +  0ht

h0t   (1  h)h0t 1

+ gt
= s (1  nt )wtnt + (1  s) (1  nt )wtn0t
+sht ph;tht + (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t;
since the terms bt, b0t and b
g
t cancel out. With x
T
t = sxt + (1  s)x0t for aggregate
variables this becomes to
cTt + ph;t
 
1 + ht

hTt   (1  h)hTt 1

+ gt
=(1  nt )wtnTt + ht ph;thTt ;
which can further be simplied to
cTt + ph;th
T
t + gt
=wtn
T
t + ph;t(1  h)hTt 1:
Inserting the production functions, we get (14).
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5.2 Solution of the Full Version
5.2.1 Summary of Private Sector Equilibrium Conditions
Summarizing the private sector equilibrium conditions delivers
h 
h
t =
 
1 + ht

ph;tc
 c
t   c 
c
t+1 (1  h) ph;t+1
n
n
t =(1  nt )wtc 
c
t
c 
c
t = Rtc
 c
t+1
c 
c
t = R
g
t c
 c
t+1
h0 
h
t =
 
1 +  0ht

ph;tc
0 c
t   0c0 
c
t+1 (1  h) ph;t+1 + !tmph;t+1
n0
n
t =(1  nt )wtc0 
c
t
!t=
c0 
c
t   0c0 
c
t+1 Rt
Rt
c0t+
 
1 +  0ht

ph;th
0
t = (1  nt )wtn0t + (1  h)ph;th0t 1  
b0t+1
Rt
+ b0t
0=
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
gt   sht ph;tht   (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t   nt wtnTt

+ bg0
yc;t=n
T
c;t, yh;t = n
T
h;t, wt = 1, ph;t = 1
hTt = sht + (1  s)h0t, nTt = snt + (1  s)n0t, cTt = sct + (1  s) c0t
nTt =n
T
c;t + n
T
h;t, b
0
t+1   mph;t+1h0t,
cTt + gt + ph;th
T
t = yc;t + ph;tyh;t + (1  h)ph;thTt 1
Eliminating prices and using 
tc 
c
t
c 
c
0
=
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1 the conditions above can be
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reduced to
h 
h
t =
 
1 + ht

c 
c
t    (1  h) c 
c
t+1
n
n
t c
c
t =(1  nt )
Rgt =Rt =
c 
c
t
c 
c
t+1
h0 
h
t =
 
1 +  0ht

c0 
c
t   0 (1  h) c0 
c
t+1 +m
"
c0 
c
t
c 
c
t
c 
c
t+1   0c0 
c
t+1
#
n0
n
t c
0c
t =(1  nt )
c0t+
 
1 +  0ht

h0t = (1  nt )n0t + (1  h)h0t 1 +
mh0t
c 
c
t
c 
c
t+1  mh0t 1
0=
1X
t=0
 
tc 
c
t
c 
c
0
!
gt   sht ht   (1  s)  0ht h0t   nt nTt

+ bg0
sct+(1  s) c0t + gt + sht + (1  s)h0t
= snt + (1  s)n0t + (1  h)
 
sht 1 + (1  s)h0t 1

given bg0 > 0 and b0 > 0.
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5.2.2 The Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem reads
J =
1X
t=0
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
tsu(ct; ht; nt) + 
0t (1  s)u(c0t; h0t; n0t)
+ett;1 hh ht    1 + ht  c ct +  (1  h) c ct+1 i
+ett;2 hnnt cct   1 + nt i+ ett;3 hn0nt c0ct   1 + nt i
+ett;4
2664h0 
h
t  
 
1 +  0ht

c0 
c
t + 
0 (1  h) c0 ct+1
 m

c0 
c
t c
c
t c
 c
t+1   0c0 
c
t+1

3775
+ett;5
2664 c0t  
 
1 +  0ht

h0t + (1  nt )n0t + (1  h)h0t 1
+
mh0t
c 
c
t
c 
c
t+1  mh0t 1
3775
+ett;6
2664  sct   (1  s) c0t   gt   sht   (1  s)h0t
+snt + (1  s)n0t + (1  h)
 
sht 1 + (1  s)h0t 1

3775
+t7
c 
c
t
c 
c
0

gt   sht ht   (1  s)  0ht h0t   nt (snt + (1  s)n0t)

+ t7b
g
0
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
where t;i denotes the Langrange multiplier on constraint i in period t, while the
multiplier 7 on the implementabilitiy constraint, which is derived in Appendix 5.2.3,
has no time index since it is an intertemporal constraint. The rst order conditions
of the Ramsey problem are derived in Appendix 5.2.4, where also the steady state
of the problem is given.
5.2.3 Intertemporal Government Budget Constraint
The intertemporal government budget constraint is derived as follows. We write the
government budget (6) for t+ 1 and solve for
bgt+1 = s
h
t+1ph;t+1ht+1 + (1  s)  0ht+1ph;t+1h0t+1 + nt+1wt+1nTt+1   gt+1 +
bgt+2
Rgt+1
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and insert this in the one for t
gt  1
Rgt

sht+1ph;t+1ht+1 + (1  s)  0ht+1ph;t+1h0t+1 + nt+1wt+1nTt+1   gt+1 +
bgt+2
Rgt+1

+ bgt
= sht ph;tht + (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t + nt wtnTt :
This can be rewritten as
gt+
gt+1
Rgt
  b
g
t+2
RgtR
g
t+1
+ bgt = s
h
t ph;tht + (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t
+
sht+1ph;t+1ht+1 + (1  s)  0ht+1ph;t+1h0t+1
Rgt
+ nt wtn
T
t +
nt+1wt+1n
T
t+1
Rgt
:
Iterating on this we get with the transversality condition on government debt the
intertemporal government budget constraint
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
gt + b
g
0
=
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
sht ph;tht + (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t +
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
nt wtn
T
t
,
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
gt   sht ph;tht   (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t   nt wtnTt

+ bg0 = 0:
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5.2.4 First Order Conditions and Steady State
The rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem can be summarized by:
t;1c
 c
t + bt7 c ct
c 
c
0
sht=0
t;2 + t;3   t;5n0t   bt7 c ct
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0
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t;4c
0 c
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t +
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0
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(1  nt )
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c
0
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with bt = tet =  s0(1 s)t =


0
1 st
and 
t
= 
0tet =

0
s0(1 s)
t
=
h
0

sit
:
Assuming that we are initially in the steady state (c0 = c for t = 0), where
variables without subscript denote steady state values henceforth, these conditions
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read in the steady state
1c
 c + 7sh=0 (17)
2 + 3   5n0   7nT =0 (18)
4c
0 c + 5h0 + 7 (1  s)h0=0 (19)
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c
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 0hh0   nnT =0 (21)
h 
h

1  1
h
sh

+ 6
he(1  h)  1i  7h=0 (22)
 nn + 2
n (1  n)
sn
+ 6   7n=0 (23)
(1  s) c0
c
+ 3 (1  n) c0c + 4

1 +  0h +m    (1  h +m)

  5
cc0 c 1
  6 (1  s)
cc0 c 1
=0 (24)
h0 
h

1  4 
h
(1  s)h0

+ 5
"e(1  h  m)  1   0h +m
1  s
#
+6
he(1  h)  1i  7 0h=0 (25)
 n0n + 3
n (1  n)
(1  s)n0 + 5
(1  n)
(1  s) + 6   7
n=0: (26)
The private sector equilibrium conditions that determine the steady state together
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with the rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem (17)-(26) are given by
h 
h
= c 
c  
1 + h
   (1  h) (27)
n
n
c
c
=(1  n) (28)
Rg =R =
1

h0 
h
= c0 
c  
1 +  0h
  0 (1  h) +m (   0) (29)
n0
n
c0
c
=(1  n) (30)
c0=n0 (1  n) + h0 m (   1)  h    0h (31)
g + (1  ) bg = shh+ (1  s)  0hh0 + n (sn+ (1  s)n0) (32)
sc+ (1  s) c0 + g= sn+ (1  s)n0   hsh  h (1  s)h0: (33)
5.3 Representative Agent Version
5.3.1 Solution
The rst order conditions of the representative household are given by (with uxt =
@u
@xt
)
uht + u
c
t+1 (1  h) ph;t+1=uct
 
1 + ht

ph;t (34)
unt = uctwt (1  nt ) (35)
uct =u
c
t+1R
g
t (36)
and the transversality condition on bonds holds limt!1 
tuct
bgt+1
Rgt
= 0: Inserting (36)
in (34) delivers the relationship bewteen the marginal utilities of housing and con-
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sumption
uht
uct
=
 
1 + ht

ph;t   (1  h)
Rgt
ph;t+1: (37)
The rst order conditions of the rms lead to the real wage rate wt = 1and the
price of housing ph;t = 1 and the aggregate ressource constraint reads
ct + gt + ht   (1  h)ht 1 = nt (38)
The Ramsey problem is to maximize social welfare subject to the aggregate
ressource contraint (38) and the implementability constraint (46), which is derived
in the appendix 5.3.3, and can be written as
J =
1X
t=0
t
8>><>>:
u(ct; ht; nt) + 

uctct + u
h
t ht + u
n
t nt

+t [ ct   gt   ht + nt + (1  h)ht 1]
9>>=>>;+  [(1  h)ph;0h 1 + bg0] :
Insertion of the marginal utilities leads to
J =
1X
t=0
t
8>><>>:
u(ct; ht; nt) + 
n
c1 
c
t + h
1 h
t   n1+
n
t
o
+t [ ct   gt   ht + nt + (1  h)ht 1]
9>>=>>;+  [(1  h)ph;0h 1 + bg0] :
The rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem are given by
@J
@ct
= 0) t = c 
c
t [1 +  (1  c)] (39)
@J
@nt
= 0) t = n
n
t [1 +  (1 + 
n)] : (40)
Equalizing (39) and (40) we get the optimal labor income tax
(1  nt )= (35)
n
n
t
c 
c
t
=
[1 +  (1  c)]
[1 +  (1 + n)]
(41)
) n=1  [1 +  (1  
c)]
[1 +  (1 + n)]
=
 (n + c)
1 +  (1 + n)
> 0 for  > 0:
39
As we can see in
@n
@
=
n + c
[1 +  (1 + n)]2
> 0;
the labor income tax is increasing in  and is concave for c  1 (see appendix
5.3.2).
The rst order condition with respect to housing is given by
@J
@ht
= 0)h ht + 
 
1  hh ht   t + t+1 (1  h) = 0
, t = h 
h
t + 
 
1  hh ht + t+1 (1  h)
) (39)c ct [1 +  (1  c)] = h 
h
t + 
 
1  hh ht
+c 
c
t+1 [1 +  (1  c)]  (1  h)
) [1 +  (1  c)] = h
 h
t + c
 c
t+1  (1  h)
c 
c
t| {z }
(1+ht )
+
 
1  h h ht
c 
c
t
+
c 
c
t+1 
c 
c
t| {z }
1=Rgt
 (1  c) (1  h) :
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Hence, the optimal tax rate on housing can be written as
ht =  (1  c)  
 
1  h h ht
c 
c
t
   (1  
c) (1  h)
Rgt
= 
"
1  c    1  h h ht
c 
c
t
  (1  
c) (1  h)
Rgt
#
= (43)

1  c    1  h  1 + ht   (1  h)Rgt

  (1  
c) (1  h)
Rgt

= 
"
1  c    1  h  1 + ht +  1  h (1  h)Rgt   (1  
c) (1  h)
Rgt
#
= 
"
1  c   1 + h    1  h ht +  1  h   1 + c (1  h)Rgt
#
) ht

1 + 
 
1  h = "h   c    h   c (1  h)
Rgt
#
ht =

1 +  (1  h)
 
h   c1  (1  h)
Rgt

;
with h
 h
t
c 
c
t
=
 
1 + ht
  (1 h)
Rgt
following from (43). In the steady state with Rgt = 
 1
the optimal housing tax rate is given by
h =

 
h   c
1   (h   1) (1   (1  h)) : (42)
The housing tax rate is increasing in  for c < h and decreasing for case
c > h, as
@h
@
=
 
h   c
[1   (h   1)]2 [1   (1  h)]
shows. Furthermore, h is convex for case 2 and h  1 (see Appendix 5.3.2).
5.3.2 Additionals on Optimal Tax Rates
Second Derivatives
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The second derivatives wrt housing are given by
@2J
@h2t
=  hh 1 ht| {z }
>0

1    h   1 :
Whether this expression is positive or negative depends on the last term. We get
@2J
@h2t
< 0 and thus a maximum for
1    h   1 > 0,  < 1
(h   1) :
For c and n the second derivatives are always positive for 1  c  2, which is the
case in the benchmark calibration,
@2J
@c2t
=  cc 1 ct| {z }
>0
[1   (c   1)] < 0
, < 1
(c   1)  1 for 1  
c  2;
and
@2J
@n2t
=  nn 1+nt| {z }
>0
[1 +  (n + 1)] < 0:
Shape of the Tax Rates
The labor income tax in conave in  for c  1 since
@2n
@
=
1 + + n   2n   2c   2 (n)2   2cn
[1 +  (1 + n)]3
=
<0 for c1z }| {
1 +   2c+
<0z }| {
n   2n 2 (n)2   2cn
[1 +  (1 + n)]3
< 0:
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The housing tax is convex for c < h and h > 1 due to
@h
@
=
 
h   c
[1   (h   1)]2 [1   (1  h)]
@2h
@2
=
>0 for < 1
(h 1)z }| {
1    h   1+ >0 for 
h>1z }| {
2
 
h   1  h   c [1   (1  h)]
[1   (h   1)]3 > 0:
5.3.3 Derivation of the Implementability Constraint
The implementability constraint is derived as follows. We write (37) in the form
Rgt =
(1  h)ph;t+1 
1 + ht

ph;t   u
h
t
uct
(43)
and rewrite condition (36):
uct = u
c
t 1
 
Rgt 1
 1
and uct 1 = u
c
t 2
 
Rgt 2
 1 ) uct = uct 2 2  Rgt 1 1  Rgt 2 1 :
Iterating forward we get
tuct = u
c
0
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1 : (44)
Thus we can rewrite the transversality condition as (with uc0 > 0)
lim
t!1
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1 b
g
t+1
Rgt
= 0:
Now we solve the household budget constraint for period t+ 1 for bgt+1
bgt+1 = ct+1 +
 
1 + ht+1

ph;t+1ht+1 +
bgt+2
Rgt+1
   1  nt+1wt+1nt+1   (1  h)ph;t+1ht
43
and insert this in the one for period t to get
ct +
 
1 + ht

ph;tht +
1
Rgt
2664 ct+1 +
 
1 + ht+1

ph;t+1ht+1 +
bgt+2
Rgt+1
   1  nt+1wt+1nt+1   (1  h)ph;t+1ht
3775  bgt
=(1  nt )wtnt + (1  h)ph;tht 1.
This can be rewritten as
ct +
ct+1
Rgt
+
 
1 + ht

ph;tht   (1  h)ph;t+1ht
Rgt
+
 
1 + ht+1

ph;t+1ht+1
Rgt
+
bgt+2
RgtR
g
t+1
=(1  nt )wtnt +
 
1  nt+1

wt+1nt+1
Rgt
+ (1  h)ph;tht 1 + bgt :
We now collect the terms with ht, factor out ht and insert (43)
ht
 
1 + ht

ph;t   (1  h)ph;t+1
Rgt

= (43)ht
 
1 + ht

ph;t   (1  h)ph;t+1
(1  h) ph;t+1
 
1 + ht

ph;t   u
h
t
uct

=ht
 
1 + ht

ph;t  
 
1 + ht

ph;t   u
h
t
uct

= ht
uht
uct
: (45)
Thus we can rewrite the buget constraint again to get
ct +
ct+1
Rgt
+ ht
uht
uct
+
 
1 + ht+1

ph;t+1ht+1
Rgt
+
bgt+2
RgtR
g
t+1
=(1  nt )wtnt +
 
1  nt+1

wt+1nt+1
Rgt
+ (1  h)ph;tht 1 + bgt :
Inserting the budget constraint of t+ 2 then delivers
ct +
ct+1
Rgt
+ ht
uht
uct
+
 
1 + ht+1

ph;t+1ht+1
Rgt
+
1
RgtR
g
t+1

ct+2 +
 
1 + ht+2

ph;t+2ht+2 +
bgt+3
Rgt+2
   1  nt+2wt+2nt+2   (1  h)ph;t+2ht+1
=(1  nt )wtnt +
 
1  nt+1

wt+1nt+1
Rgt
+ (1  h)ph;tht 1 + bgt :
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We can rewrite this as
ct +
ct+1
Rgt
+
ct+2
RgtR
g
t+1
+ ht
uht
uct
+
 
1 + ht+1

ph;t+1ht+1
Rgt
  (1  h)ph;t+2ht+1
RgtR
g
t+1
+
 
1 + ht+2

ph;t+2ht+2
RgtR
g
t+1
+
bgt+3
RgtR
g
t+1R
g
t+2
= (1  nt )wtnt +
 
1  nt+1

wt+1nt+1
Rgt
+
 
1  nt+2

wt+2nt+2
RgtR
g
t+1
+ (1  h)ph;tht 1 + bgt :
Repeating the steps above in (45) we get
ct +
ct+1
Rgt
+
ct+2
RgtR
g
t+1
+ ht
uht
uct
+
ht+1
Rgt
uht+1
uct+1
+
 
1 + ht+2

ph;t+2ht+2
RgtR
g
t+1
+
bgt+3
RgtR
g
t+1R
g
t+2
=(1  nt )wtnt +
 
1  nt+1

wt+1nt+1
Rgt
+
 
1  nt+2

wt+2nt+2
RgtR
g
t+1
+ (1  h)ph;tht 1 + bgt :
Iterating on this and using the transversality conditions, we get the intertemporal
budget constraint with the initial endowments of h 1 and b
g
0
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
ct +
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
ht
uht
uct
=
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
(1  nt )wtnt + (1  h)ph;0h 1 + bg0;
which can be rewritten as
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
ct + ht
uht
uct
  (1  nt )wtnt

+ (1  h)ph;0h 1 + bg0 = 0:
By eliminating prices with (44) and (35) we get the implementability constraint
1X
t=0
t
uct
uc0

ct + ht
uht
uct
+
unt
uct
nt

+ (1  h)ph;0h 1 + bg0=0:
,uc0>0
1X
t=0
t

uctct + u
h
t ht + u
n
t nt

+ (1  h)ph;0h 1uc0 + bg0uc0=0: (46)
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